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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in the blockchain research have been made in two
important directions. One is refined resilience analysis utilizing
game theory to study the consequences of selfish behavior of users
(miners), and the other is the extension from a linear (chain) structure to a non-linear (graphical) structure for performance improvements, such as IOTA and Graphcoin. The first question that comes
to mind is what improvements that a blockchain system would see
by leveraging these new advances. In this paper, we consider three
major properties for a blockchain system: 𝛼-partial verification, scalability, and finality-duration. We establish a formal framework and
prove that no blockchain system can achieve 𝛼-partial verification
for any fixed constant 𝛼, high scalability, and low finality-duration
simultaneously. We observe that classical blockchain systems like
Bitcoin achieves full verification (𝛼 = 1) and low finality-duration,
Ethereum 2.0 Sharding achieves low finality-duration and high
scalability. We are interested in whether it is possible to partially
satisfy the three properties.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Blockchain is a decentralized ledger that provides a system for selfinterested parties to carry out transactions without a fully trusted
central system. As such, there is no centralized party who can
compute an optimal solution or a Nash equilibrium in advance and
then tell each user to take certain actions, as this will violate the
foundations of blockchain systems. The basic idea behind this is that,
instead of having trust in a centralized system or any other specific
participant, each participant chooses to trust the majority of the
Proc. of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2021), U. Endriss, A. Nowé, F. Dignum, A. Lomuscio (eds.), May 3–7, 2021, Online.
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participants and accepts the outcome achieved through consensus
among them. [14]
One major reason that hinders the adoption of blockchain is
scalability [30]. For example, Bitcoin network can only process
less than 10 transactions per second on average [9], while typical
payment systems like Visa can process thousands of transactions
per second.
Recently, a variety of approaches are proposed to address the
scalability issue. Most of them follow the general framework of
divide and conquer, e.g., Zilliqa [27], Harmony [26], and Ethereum
2.0 [25], and use a sharding scheme that allows transactions to
be processed by a subgroup of nodes (a sharding committee). A
sharding scheme usually has a critical issue in terms of resilience,
as the correctness of each transaction now solely depends on a
subgroup of voters. Consequently, if common consensus protocols
like Proof-of-Work (PoW) or Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) is
used within subgroups, then the fraction of malicious nodes within
every subgroup cannot exceed 1/2 or 1/3, which is a significantly
stronger assumption than that of a standard blockchain system. A
typical blockchain system only requires that the fraction of malicious nodes do not exceed 1/2 or 1/3 of all nodes. We remark that
both Harmony and Ethereum 2.0 claim that if subgroups are generated in a perfect randomized way, then the percentage of honest
nodes within each subgroup is almost the same as their percentage
in the whole group of nodes; however, this requires a perfect distributed random number generation as a separate procedure, which
brings an additional assumption on the security of this additional
procedure.
To guarantee that every transaction is correctly executed by
only relying on the standard assumption that the majority of the
nodes are honest, we must require every transaction to be verified
by all the nodes. Consequently, it is a straightforward question
of whether scalability is achievable at all, as it appears that any
divide and conquer based solution would inevitably reduce the
total number of verifications received by a transaction. A "nonlinear" blockchain structure recently introduced by IOTA [16] and
Graphcoin [4], can neglect such limitations. The basic idea is to
allow blocks to be connected as a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
instead of a chain. Such a non-linear structure implements a divide
and conquer approach implicitly by allowing multiple blocks to
be appended simultaneously, as a general graph can be extended

in multiple directions. Meanwhile, if we treat different growing
directions as soft forks or branches, then it is possible (depending
on system parameters) that they can “merge" again in the future
(see the following figure 2, where the sequences of blocks that
follow block 𝐴 and 𝐵 meet at block 𝐶). Therefore, a node that tries
to append a new block is required to verify a few previous blocks.
So, there is a possibility that a block may still be verified by all the
nodes, albeit the delay of such verification.
On a high level, there are three crucial properties involved in
a general blockchain system: verification, scalability, and finalityduration. In a nutshell, 𝛼-partial verification requires every transaction to be verified by at least 𝛼 fraction of all the nodes (which
thus ensures resilience under the standard assumption that the
majority of the nodes follow the protocol); scalability means the
system throughput, or the total number of transactions executed
per unit of time, is proportional to the total number of participating
nodes; and finality-duration means the delay in reaching consensus
on the correctness of the execution of each transaction. We give a
precise definition in Section 3.
Classical blockchain systems like Bitcoin achieves full verification and low finality-duration, but not scalability. This is because
Bitcoin requires every block, and hence the transactions within a
block, to be verified by all the nodes; meanwhile, it has a constant
finality-duration because every block is finalized after a constant
number of blocks are appended afterward. However, it does not
scale, as the increase in the number of nodes does not allow the
system to handle more transactions per unit of time, which has
been pointed out in many prior papers [14, 21, 22, 28].On the other
hand, blockchain systems like Harmony [26] and Ethereum 2.0 [25]
achieve constant finality-duration and scalability, but not full verification. For example, the sharding scheme used in Ethereum 2.0
allows a block to be verified within a shard (which is a subset of
nodes).
In this paper, we provide a view on the relationships between
full verification (or more precisely, 𝛼-partial verification for any
constant 𝛼), low finality-duration, and scalability. More precisely:
Our contributions. We show that it is impossible to achieve full
verification, low finality-duration and scalability simultaneously.
Given the fact that: (i) Bitcoin achieves full verification and low
(asymptotically constant) finality-duration, but not scalability; and
(ii) Ethereum 2.0 achieves low (constant) finality-duration and scalability, but not full verification, it is natural to explore to what extent
a blockchain system can be designed considering the different tradeoff scenarios. In particular, does there exist a blockchain system
that satisfies both full verification and scalability/finality-duration?
Is it possible to have a system that partially satisfies all of the three
properties? We give an affirmative answer in this paper. In particular, we prove that by adopting a non-linear blockchain system and
employing a game-theoretical analysis, we can construct a system
which achieves full verification and a trade-off between scalability
and finality-duration. Informally speaking, the following properties
hold simultaneously for the constructed blockchain system:
(i) 𝑂 (𝑠) new blocks are generated per unit of time on average;
(ii) after 𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠) units of time, with a very high probability, each
block will be verified by all users in the systems.

Here 𝑠 is a system parameter that can be set suitably at the genesis
block. When 𝑠 = 1, the non-linear system degenerates to a linear
system with a fixed block generation rate that is independent of
the nodes in the system, while the delay which is an indication of
finality duration, is a constant. This coincides with the classical
Bitcoin system. Conversely, 𝑠 can be as high as 𝑂 (𝑚) where 𝑚
is the number of nodes. In this case, the system is fully scalable,
albeit that only a sufficiently long delay (𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠)) can ensure full
verification. However, if we set 𝑠 to be 𝑂 (𝑚) to enforce scalability
and meanwhile enforce the delay to be some constant instead of
𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠), then full verification cannot be guaranteed.
We remark that the big-𝑂 notation in our statements hides a
constant which is roughly the average time for a block to be generated, that is, we measure the delay in terms of the number of blocks;
therefore, Bitcoin is considered as low (asymptotically constant)
finality-duration as the delay is constant blocks. Our result does
not conflict with prior researches that complain about the “high”
finality-duration of Bitcoin because of the long time it takes to
generate a single block [4, 16]. The research that tries to decrease
such a block generation time is parallel to this paper. For example, if
a lighter version of PoW can be used in the existing Bitcoin system,
then it can also be used directly in our non-linear blockchain system, while our impossibility result, as well as the trade-off between
finality-duration and scalability, remain the same.

2

RELATED WORK

The study of e-cash systems dates back to 1983 [5, 20]. However,
all such systems require a centrally or quasi-centrally controlling
authority. A well-known exception, Bitcoin, was introduced by
Nakamoto [14] in 2008, which uses a public ledger known as a
blockchain to record transactions carried out between users. Following this line of research, various alternative blockchain-based
transaction systems are proposed [13, 21, 22, 28], further improving
the performance and security of Bitcoin as well as extending the
system to deal with applications beyond transactions (e.g., smart
contracts). In [23], Sompolinsky and Zohar have introduced an
alternative to the longest chain that allows more transactions to
take place at a lower cost. Recently, Sompolinsky et al. [24] have
shown faster block generation by generalizing blockchain to a direct acyclic graph of blocks. Blockchain-based consensus protocols
Fantômette and Avalanche that rely on blockDAG were proposed
in [2, 18]. We refer the readers to several surveys on blockchain
systems [1, 3, 7, 10–12, 19, 29, 32]. In particular, [29] provides a
comprehensive introduction to the bitcoin network,[3, 10] focus
on the systematized study of the blockchain consensus protocols,
[7, 11, 19] focus on the security and privacy results on blockchain,
[1] focuses on the applications of blockchain. The most relevant
survey to this paper is [12], which summarizes recent results on
game-theoretical studies of blockchain. However, most of the existing game theoretical research primarily focuses on the traditional
linear blockchain system, only a very recent paper by Popov et
al. [17] gives the first game-theoretical analysis of IOTA. Their
result, however, does not establish the trade-off between scalability
and finality-duration.

2.1

Classical and Non-linear Blockchain

Chain-structured blockchain. Most of the existing blockchain
systems, e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger, follow the classical
structure where blocks form a chain as illustrated by Fig 1.

Figure 1: Chain-structured blockchain. The chain grows
from left to right. White squares form the main chain, and
gray squares form the side chains that are discarded eventually.

Non-linear (graph-structured) blockchain. Popov introduced
the concept of tangle [16] which allows a blockchain to adopt a
directed acyclic graph (DAG) architecture. We summarize the abstract model of a non-linear blockchain in Section 3. We briefly
review IOTA, which is the most well-known non-linear blockchain
system so far. On a high level, IOTA allows each transaction be an
individual node linked in the distributed ledger. We may interpret
a transaction as a block in such a system. In the tangle, each user
needs to select one transaction from the pool as well as two previous blocks (transactions) in the system. The user verifies these
two transactions and mines a new block referring to them. Then
this new block (transaction) is broadcasted to the tangle network.
Figure 2 gives a simple example of a non-linear blockchain.

• C defines the way to check a block, including validity verification, such as whether the block has the correct format and
whether transactions included in the block are valid, and
whether the block is finalized.
• R defines the way how the award is assigned to a user who
adds a new block to the DAG. A NLB needs to encourage
users to participate in the construction of the blockchain by
giving rewards to those who add new blocks.
• E defines the rules to eliminate conflicting blocks. Similar
to a linear blockchain, it is possible that multiple participants have different local copies of the blockchain, and E
determines which version should be kept.
Next, we provide formal definitions of the three metrics of a
blockchain system that we mentioned earlier.
Definition 1 (Partial verification). For any fixed 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1],
a blockchain system satisfies the property of 𝛼-partial verification if
every block is verified by at least 𝛼 fraction of the total nodes in the
system before it is finalized.
In particular, if 𝛼 = 1, then each block is verified by all the nodes
and we call it full verification. If a blockchain system satisfies full
verification, then resilience follows directly from standard assumptions on the percentage of honest nodes among all nodes, e.g., if
the blockchain uses PoW or BFT as the consensus protocol, then it
is resilient, once the majority or 2/3 of nodes follow the protocol.
This is also true for 𝛼-partial verification if the 𝛼-fraction of the
nodes are randomly selected from all nodes. Indeed, many recently
developed blockchain systems that claim to achieve scalability, e.g.,
Ethereum 2.0 [25] implements such an idea by letting a subset of
nodes (i.e., a Shard) compute and verify a smart contract. The size
of such a subset divided by the total number of nodes gives the
percentage 𝛼.
Definition 2 (Scalability). The throughput of a blockchain
system is the number of blocks 𝑛𝑏 that can be added to the system in
a fixed time. A blockchain system scales with the number of nodes 𝑚
in the system if 𝑛𝑏 → ∞ when 𝑚 → ∞. Particularly, a blockchain
system fully scales with the number of nodes 𝑚 if 𝑛𝑏 = Ω(𝑚).

Figure 2: A non-linear blockchain. White squares are verified transactions/blocks.

3

THE ABSTRACT MODEL

We describe an abstract model of a non-linear blockchain which
is general enough to incorporate existing well-known non-linear
blockchain systems like IOTA and Graphcoin.
A non-linear blockchain NLB is defined by a quadruple
NLB : (A, C, R, E), where
• A defines the rules of building and adding a new block to the
blockchain. Since we are considering non-linear blockchain,
A allows multiple blocks to be added simultaneously.

It should be clear that the definition of scalability or full scalability does not depend on the length of the time period chosen for
throughput. It captures the possibility of speeding up blockchain
generation with more participating nodes; consequently, classical
blockchain systems like Bitcoin does not scale.
Definition 3 (Finality-duration). The finality-duration of a
blockchain system is the time difference between the time point when
a block is appended and the time point when a block receives full
verification.
We say the finality-duration of a blockchain system is low (or
constant) if the finality-duration is independent of the nodes in the
system; consequently, classical blockchain systems like Bitcoin has
a low (asymptotically constant) finality-duration because after a
fixed number of blocks are appended, all the nodes start following
the main chain, thus blocks on the main chain will receive full
verification.

4

IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT

Theorem 1. There does not exist a blockchain system that simultaneously satisfies (i) scalability; (ii) low finality-duration; and
(iii) 𝛼-partial verification for an arbitrary constant 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1].
The proof follows from a counting argument on the total number
of verifications.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists such a blockchain. Then by definition, every block or transaction will receive
verifications from at least 𝛼 fraction of the nodes within a constant
delay. Let 𝑐 0 be the constant delay. Consider an arbitrary node 𝑥
and let 𝜏𝑥 be the fixed time it takes for node 𝑥 to perform one
verification. Let the throughput of the blockchain be 𝑛𝑏 , then by
definition of scalability, 𝑛𝑏 = 𝑛𝑏 (𝑚) → ∞ when 𝑚 → ∞. Note that
all the 𝑛𝑏 blocks generated shall be verified by at least 𝛼 fraction
of nodes within the delay of 𝑐 0 , which means on average, every
node should perform 𝛼𝑛𝑏 verifications within 𝑐 0 . However, node
𝑥 can only perform 𝑐 0 /𝜏𝑥 verifications, which is a constant. Since
𝑛𝑏 → ∞, when 𝑚 is sufficiently large, 𝛼𝑛𝑏 > 𝑐 0 /𝜏𝑥 for any fixed
𝛼. Therefore, it is impossible for an arbitrary node 𝑥 to complete
all the verifications. Hence, the three properties, scalability, low
finality-duration and 𝛼-partial verifications, cannot be satisfied
simultaneously.
□
Remark. If 𝛼 is not a constant, e.g., 𝛼 = 10/𝑁 where 𝑁 is the total
number of nodes, then 𝛼 → 0 and it is indeed possible to guarantee
scalability and low finality-duration simultaneously.

is denoted as 𝑑 (𝐴, 𝐵). If there is no such a directed path, we define
𝑑 (𝐴, 𝐵) = ∞. If 0 < 𝑑 (𝐴, 𝐵) < ∞, we say 𝐵 is a descendant of 𝐴,
and 𝐴 is an ancestor of 𝐵. For a block 𝐵 and each 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ ℓ, let
Anc(𝐵, 𝑘) = {𝑋 |𝑑 (𝑋, 𝐵) = 𝑘 } and Des(𝐵, 𝑘) = {𝑑 (𝐵, 𝑋 ) = 𝑘 }, where
ℓ is a given parameter.
The new NLB is constructed as follows:
• A. The new NLB assumes that there is a pool of new transactions from which a user can select one to construct a
new block, which refers to two previous blocks1 . The user
then does lightweight mining to fix this information in the
newly constructed block. Lightweight mining is a common
approach used in blockchain systems supporting lightweight
users (see, e.g. [31]). It means that the user needs shorter
computation time, compared with the standard mining process, to find a value for the block that makes it a valid block.
This is usually done by a loose requirement on the hash
result of the block together with the mined value. Suppose
that the newly built block is 𝐵, the user also verifies blocks
in Anc(𝐵, 𝑘), 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ ℓ, where ℓ is a pre-defined system
parameter that determines how many previous blocks the
producer of a new block should verify.
• C. To check a block 𝐵, the algorithm first checks whether
the block format is correct, including the verification of the
mining outcome. The algorithm also checks whether 𝐵 is
finalized or not, which is determined by
ℓ
numAnc ← | ∪𝑘=1
Anc(𝐵, 𝑘)|.

5

SATISFYING IMPOSSIBILITY-TRIANGLE IN
A LIQUID WAY

We first propose a concrete construction of NLB that achieves both
security and scalability under the agent model (Based on the agent
model, every participant is an agent who tries to maximise his/her
profit). Without loss of generality, we assume that each block only
includes one transaction. In the following, we broaden the terms
and use them interchangeably. We first define some concepts.

If numAnc is larger than the system pre-defined threshold, 𝐵
is finalized.
• R. Each block has a reward value and the system imposes
an upper bound on the maximal reward offered by a transaction, so that the largest and smallest reward among transactions (and blocks) can differ by a factor at most Δ. The
producer of the new block also receives rewards from previous blocks. Specifically, each block is associated with a
uniform verification cost vrf, which is divided into ℓ parts
Íℓ
such that vrf1 < vrf2 < · · · < vrfℓ and 𝑘=1
vrf𝑘 = vrf.
For each 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ ℓ, the producer of block 𝐵 gets reward
vrf𝑘 /|Des(𝑋, 𝑘)| for each 𝑋 ∈ Anc(𝐵, 𝑘). This means that the
verification reward of vrf𝑘 from block 𝑋 is evenly distributed
among all descendants in Des(𝐵, 𝑘). Note that the reward is
not uniformly divided and it will be only collected when the
new block is finalized.
• E. The constructed NLB adopts the largest-weighted descendants principle (LWD) to eliminate disagreement, i.e., when
there are blocks containing conflicting transactions, the one
whose descendants have a largest total weight will be selected. Note that this will not prevent multiple non-conflict
blocks from being added in parallel. Formally, for each block
𝐵, let Des(𝐵) = ∪ℎ ≥1 {𝑋 |𝑑 (𝐵, 𝑋 )}. If there are two conflicting
blocks 𝐵, 𝐵 ′ and |Des(𝐵)| > |Des(𝐵 ′ )|, then 𝐵 prevails, that
is, users will abandon 𝐵 ′ together with all its descendants

Definition 4 (Block distance, descendant, and ancestor).
Given two blocks 𝐴 and 𝐵, we define the distance between the two
blocks as the length of the shortest directed path from 𝐴 to 𝐵, which

1 Our analysis in this paper also works if a new block refers to any fixed constant
(greater than or equal to 2) number of blocks. For ease of presentation, we take this
number to be 2 throughout this paper.

As we have mentioned before, Bitcoin achieves full verification
and low finality-duration at the cost of scalability, Ethereum 2.0
achieves scalability and low finality-duration, but cannot guarantee
a constant 𝛼 for partial verification. These systems obey our impossibility triangle by conforming to two properties and disregarding
the third one. But what if we want all of them in partial? More
precisely, can we have a more fine-grained system that can can
smoothly transform from one extreme to another by controlling a
simple system parameter? In this section, we construct a non-linear
blockchain system, which builds upon the basic structure of IOTA,
and show that it achieves full verification, and meanwhile has a
trade-off between scalability and finality-duration. In particular, a
larger scalability implies longer finality-duration, and this can be
controlled through a single system parameter Δ as we will define
later.

5.1

Non-linear Blockchain (NLB) Construction

in the sense that a new block will not refer to any of these
blocks.
Note that when considering the private costs for the mining task
of the agents, the only difference is that the profit of each block is
no longer its reward, instead, the new profit of each agent should be
the reward of each task subtracting the (agent-dependent) cost. All
results in our paper still hold if the largest profit and smallest profit
differ by at most Δ times for all agents. In our paper, the blockchain
system is designed such that the largest and smallest reward can
differ by at most Δ times. Incorporating costs of agents, however,
this cannot be ensured by system design. Specifically, if an agent
has an excessive private cost then the ratio can be unbounded. But
in practice, it is plausible to assume that the private cost is usually
small compared with the reward of blocks.

5.2

Scalability and Finality-duration Analysis

We first give a high-level summary of the workflow of the proposed
NLB system. Transactions are generated over time and form a pool.
Each transaction is associated with a distinct transaction reward
and a fixed verification reward vrf. Each time, a miner will select
one transaction from the pool and append a block, which refers to
two previous blocks. Here the miner needs to decide two things:
(i) which transaction to include, and (ii) which two previous blocks
to refer to. As we assume that miners are rational players, they will
strategically make their decisions to maximize their profits, and
this section is devoted to analyze the scalability and security of the
system under an arbitrary Nash equilibrium.
We formalize the problem as follows. Let the pool consist of
𝑛 transactions, with the transaction reward being 𝑝 1, 𝑝 2, · · · , 𝑝𝑛 .
Let 𝑚 be the number of miners, with computational powers being
𝑢 1, 𝑢 2, · · · , 𝑢𝑚 . As we mentioned, each miner will mine a new block
by including one transaction from the pool. If multiple miners say,
miners in the subset of 𝑆, all choose the same transaction, then they
compete, and only one of them will succeed, and the probability
that some miner 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 succeeds is Í 𝑢𝑖 𝑢 . If, however, all miners
ℎ∈𝑆 ℎ
choose different transactions, then each of them can append a new
block. In the following section, we will analyze the scalability and
finality-duration of the constructed NLB separately.
5.2.1 Scalability. For scalability, we are interested in how many
different transactions from the pool can be selected by the miners simultaneously. Note that the more different transactions are
chosen, the higher scalability is. When miners choose transactions
simultaneously, we are considering the worst-case because if miners are selecting transactions at different times, later ones may be
able to avoid conflicts with earlier ones. Let 𝑛 be the number of
available transactions and 𝑚 be the number of miners, the following
Theorem 2 implies that the system is scalable even in the worst
case such that when there are sufficiently many transactions, the
throughput will be 𝑂 (𝑚/Δ) where Δ is a system parameter part of
R. By controlling Δ, we can control the scalability of the system.
In particular, when we set Δ to be a constant, the system becomes
fully scalable with the number of nodes. In the remainder of this
section is devoted to proving Theorem 2.

Theorem 2. With probability at least 1 − max{𝑒 −Θ(𝑚) , 𝑒 −Θ(𝑛) },
the number of blocks mined by 𝑚 miners in an arbitrary Nash equilibrium is at least min{𝑐 1𝑚/Δ, 𝑐 2𝑛} for some universal constants 𝑐 1, 𝑐 2 .
Notice that a Nash equilibrium always exists by allowing mixed
strategies [15]. Towards the proof, we introduce some notations.
For simplicity, let all the transaction rewards be 𝑝 1 ≥ 𝑝 2 ≥ · · · ≥ 𝑝𝑛 .
By the design of our system we require that 𝑝 1 /𝑝𝑛 ≤ Δ. Note that
the strategy of a miner is to select one transaction. We consider
the general mixed strategy of a miner where he/she can specify a
probability for each transaction.
(𝑖)
Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium and let 𝜋 (𝑖) = (𝜋 1 ,
(𝑖)

(𝑖)

𝜋2 , · · · , 𝜋𝑛 ) be the strategy of miner 𝑖 in the equilibrium, where
(𝑖)
𝜋𝑗

is the probability that he chooses transaction 𝑗. It is obvious
Í
(𝑖)
(𝑖)
that 𝑛𝑗=1 𝜋 𝑗 = 1 for any 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚. Let 𝑋 𝑗 be the 0-1 random
variable that indicates whether miner 𝑖 chooses transaction 𝑗. Then
(𝑖)
(𝑖)
(𝑖)
(𝑖)
𝑋 𝑗 = 1 with probability 𝜋 𝑗 and 𝑋 𝑗 = 0 with probability 1−𝜋 𝑗 .
Consider the above Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, if only a small
number of transactions are selected, then miners must have devoted
their probabilities to a few transactions. Therefore, to show that a
sufficient number of distinct transactions are selected in expectation,
by miners, we need to show that the miners are distributing their
probabilities in a fair way among transactions, as is implied by the
following lemma.
Í
(𝑖)
Lemma 1. If there exists some transaction 𝑗1 such that 𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗1 ≥
Í
(𝑖)
12Δ, then for every transaction 𝑗, it holds that 𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗 ≥ 1/2.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, the lemma is not true, that
Í
(𝑖)
is, there exists some transactions 𝑗1 and 𝑗2 such that 𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗1 ≥
Í𝑚 (𝑖)
12Δ and 𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗2 < 1/2. Consider the set of miners that choose
transaction 𝑗1 with positive probability. For simplicity, let these
miners be miner 1, 2, · · · , 𝑘 such that 𝑢 1 ≥ 𝑢 2 ≥ · · · ≥ 𝑢𝑘 . We
show in the following that miner 𝑘 can change his strategy to
get a strictly higher profit, contradicting the fact that this is a
Nash equilibrium, and consequently, the lemma is proved. More
precisely, we argue that player 𝑘 can get strictly larger profit (in
expectation) by increasing his probability of choosing transaction
𝑗2 and meanwhile decreasing his probability of choosing 𝑗1 .
The expected profit that miner 𝑘 can get from transaction 𝑗1 and
𝑗2 using his current strategy is equal to
𝑝 𝑗1 E[Γ1 ] + 𝑝 𝑗2 E[Γ2 ],
where for ℎ = 1, 2, we have
Í𝑛
(𝑖)



 0, if(𝑘 ) 𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖 𝑋 𝑗ℎ = 0

𝑢𝑘 𝑋 𝑗
Γℎ =
ℎ

Otherwise.

(𝑖 ) ,
 Í𝑚
𝑢𝑖 𝑋 𝑗
𝑖=1

ℎ
If 𝑘 changes his strategy by choosing 𝑗1 with the probability
(𝑘)
(𝑘)
of 0 and choosing 𝑗2 with the probability of 𝜋 𝑗1 + 𝜋 𝑗2 , then the
expected profit he can get from 𝑗1 and 𝑗2 is equal to 𝑝 𝑗2 E[ Γ̃2 ], where
Í
(𝑖)

˜ (𝑘)


 0, if 𝑖≠𝑘 𝑢𝑖 𝑋 𝑗2 + 𝑢𝑘 𝑋 𝑗2 = 0

(𝑘
)
Γ̃2 =
𝑢𝑘 𝑋˜ 𝑗
2


 Í𝑖≠𝑘 𝑢𝑖 𝑋 (𝑖 ) +𝑢𝑘 𝑋˜ (𝑘 ) , Otherwise.
𝑗2
𝑗2


(𝑘)
and 𝑋˜ 𝑗2 is the 0-1 random variable that takes the value 1 with the
(𝑘)

(𝑘)

Using 𝜇 ≥ 12Δ − 𝜋 𝑗1 ≥ 11Δ and taking 𝛿 = 1/2, we have

(𝑘)

probability of 𝜋 𝑗1 + 𝜋 𝑗2 . In the following we show that

(𝑘)

E[Γ1 ] ≤

𝑝 𝑗2 E[ Γ̃2 − Γ2 ] > 𝑝 𝑗1 E[Γ1 ],
which implies the correctness of the lemma. We prove the following
two claims.
(𝑘 )

𝜋𝑗

Claim 1. E[Γ1 ] < 2Δ1 .
Í
(𝑖)
(𝑘)
Proof. Let 𝑋 = 𝑖≠𝑘 𝑋 𝑗1 and 𝜇 = E[𝑋 ] ≥ 5Δ/𝜃 − E[𝑋 𝑗1 ] =

𝜋 𝑗1

(𝑘)

+

6Δ

(𝑘)

2𝜋 𝑗1

𝜋 𝑗1

𝑒 · 1/4 · 11Δ

<

(𝑘)

Claim 2. E[ Γ̃2 − Γ2 ] ≥ 𝜋 𝑗1 /2.
Í
(𝑖)
Proof. Let 𝑌 = 𝑖≠𝑘 𝑋 𝑗2 . Then
(𝑖)

Pr(𝑌 = 0) = Pr(𝑋 𝑗2 = 0, ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑘)

=

(𝑘)

(1 − 𝜋 𝑖𝑗2 )
Õ

(𝑖)

≥

1−

≥

1 − (1/2 − 𝜋 𝑗2 )

=

1/2 + 𝜋 𝑗2 .

𝜋 𝑗2

𝑖≠𝑘

+E[Γ1 |𝑋 ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜇] Pr(𝑋 ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜇)
Given that Γ1 ≤ 1, we know that
E[Γ1 |𝑋 ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜇]

(𝑘)

(𝑘)

(𝑘)

(𝑘)

Note that 𝑋 𝑗2 and 𝑌 are independent, hence we have the following,

(𝑘)

E[Γ1 |𝑋 ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜇, 𝑋 𝑗1 = 1] Pr(𝑋 𝑗1 = 1)
(𝑘)

=

Ö
𝑖≠𝑘

6Δ/𝜃 − 𝜋 𝑗1 . For any 𝛿 ∈ (0, 1), we have
E[Γ1 ] =
E[Γ1 |𝑋 > (1 − 𝛿)𝜇] Pr(𝑋 > (1 − 𝛿)𝜇)

=

□

.
2Δ

E[ Γ̃2 − Γ2 ]

(𝑘)

+E[Γ1 |𝑋 ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜇, 𝑋 𝑗1 = 0] Pr(𝑋 𝑗1 = 0)

≥

(𝑘)
𝜋 𝑗1

E[ Γ̃2 − Γ2 |𝑌 = 0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2

≥

(𝑘)
(𝑘)
(𝑘)
(𝑘)
(𝜋 𝑗1 + 𝜋 𝑗2 )(1/2 + 𝜋 𝑗2 ) · E[ Γ˜2 − Γ2 |𝑌 = 0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2 > 0].

· E[Γ1 |𝑋 ≤

(𝑘)
(1 − 𝛿)𝜇, 𝑋 𝑗1

= 1] ≤

(𝑘)
𝜋 𝑗1 .

Meanwhile, by 𝑢 1 ≥ 𝑢 2 ≥ · · · ≥ 𝑢𝑘 , we have

(𝑖)

(𝑘)

E[ Γ̃2 − Γ2 |𝑌 = 0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2

.

𝑖=1 𝑋 𝑗1

=

According to Chernoff bound, we know that
Pr(𝑋 ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜇) ≤ 𝑒

−𝛿 2 𝜇
2

=

(𝑘)

(𝑘)
· Pr(𝑋 𝑗2

=

(𝑘)

E[

(𝑘)

] +𝑒

−𝛿 2 𝜇
2

(1 − 𝛿)𝜇 + 𝑋 𝑗1

(𝑘)
· 𝜋 𝑗1

𝑥
Consider the function 𝜑 (𝑥) = (1−𝛿)𝜇+𝑥
, it is easy to verify that
−𝜑 (𝑥) is convex in 𝑥 ∈ (0, +∞), therefore, by Jensen’s inequality
(𝑘)

E[𝑋 𝑗1 ]

(𝑘)

(𝑘)

(1 − 𝛿)𝜇 + E[𝑋 𝑗1 ]

= 𝜑 (E[𝑋 𝑗1 ])

≥

E[𝜑 (𝑋 )]

=

𝑋 𝑗1
E[

(1 − 𝛿)𝜇

(𝑘)
+ 𝑋 𝑗1

> 0|𝑌 =

> 0, 𝑋 𝑗2

(𝑘)
0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2

> 0]

> 0)

(𝑘)
𝑢𝑘 𝑋˜ 𝑗2
(𝑘)
(𝑘)
(𝑘)
|𝑌 = 0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2 > 0, 𝑋 𝑗2 = 0] · Pr(𝑋 𝑗2 = 0)
E[
(𝑘)
˜
𝑌 + 𝑢𝑘 𝑋 𝑗 2
(𝑘)
(𝑘)
𝑢𝑘 𝑋 𝑗 2
𝑢𝑘 𝑋˜ 𝑗2
(𝑘)
(𝑘)
−
|𝑌 = 0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2 > 0, 𝑋 𝑗2 > 0]
+E[
(𝑘)
(𝑘)
˜
𝑌 + 𝑢𝑘 𝑋 𝑗 2
𝑌 + 𝑢𝑘 𝑋 𝑗 2
(𝑘)
· Pr(𝑋 𝑗2 > 0)
(𝑘)
1 − 𝜋 𝑗2

Now we have

(𝑘)

=

(𝑘)

+E[ Γ̃2 − Γ2 |𝑌 = 0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2

+E[Γ1 |𝑋 ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜇] Pr(𝑋 ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜇)
≤

> 0]

(𝑘)
(𝑘)
E[ Γ̃2 − Γ2 |𝑌 = 0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2 > 0, 𝑋 𝑗2 = 0]

.

E[Γ1 |𝑋 > (1 − 𝛿)𝜇] Pr(𝑋 > (1 − 𝛿)𝜇)
𝑋 𝑗1

> 0)

(𝑘)
(𝑘)
· Pr(𝑋 𝑗2 = 0|𝑌 = 0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2 > 0)

Therefore,
E[Γ1 ]

(𝑘)

> 0] Pr(𝑌 = 0, 𝑋˜ 𝑗2

(𝑘)
(𝑘)
Further notice that 𝑋˜ 𝑗2 and 𝑋 𝑗2 are independent, thus

(𝑘)
𝑋 𝑗1

Γ1 ≤ Í
𝑘

(𝑘)

].

Now consider the function 𝑥𝑒 −𝑥 . It is easy to verify that the function
1 for 𝑥 ≥ 1, hence, for
decreases when 𝑥 ≥ 1, therefore 𝑒 −𝑥 ≤ 𝑒𝑥
2
𝛿 𝜇
2 ≥ 1, we have
(𝑘)
E[𝑋 𝑗1 ]
−𝛿 2 𝜇
(𝑘)
+ 𝑒 2 · 𝜋 𝑗1
E[Γ1 ] ≤
(𝑘)
(1 − 𝛿)𝜇 + E[𝑋 𝑗1 ]
(𝑘)
𝜋 𝑗1
2
(𝑘)
≤
+ 2 · 𝜋 𝑗1 .
(𝑘)
𝑒𝛿
𝜇
(1 − 𝛿)𝜇 + 𝜋 𝑗1

(𝑘)

(𝑘)

(𝑘)

(𝑘)

E[ Γ̃2 − Γ2 ] ≥ (𝜋 𝑗1 + 𝜋 𝑗2 )(1/2 + 𝜋 𝑗2 )(1 − 𝜋 𝑗2 )
(𝑘)

(𝑘)

(𝑘)

For simplicity, let 𝜏 = 𝜋 𝑗1 + 𝜋 𝑗2 ∈ [0, 1] and 𝑥 = 𝜋 𝑗2 , we have
(𝑘)

𝑓 (𝑥) = E[ Γ̃2 − Γ2 ] − 1/2 · 𝜋 𝑗1 = 𝜏 (1/2 + 𝑥)(1 − 𝑥) − 1/2 · (𝜏 − 𝑥).
Notice that 𝑓 is a quadratic function in 𝑥 whose quadratic term has
negative coefficient, therefore if 𝑓 (0) ≥ 0 and 𝑓 (1) ≥ 0, then for
any 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1] we have 𝑓 (𝑥) ≥ 0. It is easy to see that 𝑓 (0) = 0, and
𝑓 (1) = 1/2 · (1 − 𝜏) ≥ 0, hence, the claim is proved.
□
Given the two claims and the fact that 𝑝 𝑗2 ≤ Δ𝑝 𝑗1 , 𝑝 𝑗2 E[ Γ̃2 −Γ2 ] >
𝑝 𝑗1 E[Γ1 ] follows and the lemma is proved. The proof of the two
claims is quite involved.
□

Lemma 1 shows that: Either no transaction has received a total
amount of probability that is larger than 12Δ, or every transaction
receives a total amount of probability at least 1/2. Note that the
two cases are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, we show in the
following that in both cases, miners will select sufficiently many
transactions with very high probability. The proofs of the following
lemmas are mathematically involved.
Í
(𝑖)
Lemma 2. If 𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗 < 12Δ holds for every transaction 𝑗, and
𝑚 = Θ(𝑚/Δ)
Δ ≤ 𝑚/12, then the probability that only 𝑘 ≤ 12𝑒Δ
different transactions are selected by 𝑚 miners is at most (1/𝑒) Θ(𝑚) .
Towards the proof of Lemma 2, we need the following Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Let 𝑘, 1/𝛿 ∈ N+ such that 𝑘𝛿 = 𝜁 ∈ (0, 1). Let 𝑎 1, 𝑎 2, · · · , 𝑎𝑛
Í
be 𝑛 numbers such that 𝑎𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝛿], 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑎𝑖 = 1. Let A = {𝑆 |𝑆 ⊆
{1, 2, · · · , 𝑛}, |𝑆 | = 𝑘 }. Then we have
Õ Õ
(
𝑎 𝑗 )𝑚 ≤ 𝑒 𝑘 𝜁 𝑚−𝑘 .
𝑆 ∈A 𝑗 ∈𝑆

Proof. Consider the event that at most 𝑘 different transactions
are chosen by 𝑚 miners. Let A = {𝑆 |𝑆 ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , 𝑛}|, |𝑆 | = 𝑘 }
be the superset of all subsets of cardinality 𝑘. For any 𝑆 ∈ A, let
𝜎𝑆 be any mapping that maps {1, 2, · · · , 𝑚} to 𝑆, and Ω𝑆 be the
set of all such mappings. Consider the event that miner 𝑖 selects
transaction 𝜎𝑆 (𝑖), we know that the event happens with the probÎ
(𝑖)
ability Pr(𝜎𝑆 ) = 𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜋𝜎𝑆 (𝑖) . Taking summation over all possible
mappings, the event that only transactions in 𝑆 are selected is at
most
𝑚
𝑚 Õ
Õ
Õ Ö
Ö
(𝑖)
(𝑖)
Pr(𝜎𝑆 ) =
𝜋𝜎 (𝑖) =
𝜋𝑗 .
𝑆

𝜎𝑆 ∈Ω𝑆 𝑖=1

the probability that no more than 𝑛/𝑒 2 transactions are selected is at
most (1/𝑒) Θ(𝑛) .
Proof. Consider the event that at most 𝜃𝑛 transactions are selected by 𝑚 miners for some 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1). Note that in this case
Í Í
(𝑖)
𝑚 = 𝑛𝑗=1 𝑚
≥ 𝑛/2, hence 𝑛 ≤ 2𝑚. Again we define
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗
A = {𝑆 |𝑆 ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , 𝑛}|, |𝑆 | = (1 − 𝜃 )𝑛} as the superset of all
the subsets of cardinality (1 −𝜃𝑛). The probability that miner 𝑖 does
Í
(𝑖)
not select any transaction in some 𝑆 ∈ A is 1 − 𝑗 ∈𝑆 𝜋 𝑗 . Given
that miners select transactions independently, the probability that
all miners do not select transactions in 𝑆 is
Í
Í
(𝑖)
𝑚
Ö
Õ
𝑚 − 𝑗 ∈𝑆 𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗
(𝑖)
)𝑚
(1 −
𝑝𝑗 ) ≤ (
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑗 ∈𝑆

See Chen et al. [6] for the full proof of Lemma 3.
Now we come to the proof of Lemma 2.

𝜎𝑆 ∈Ω𝑆

𝑚 < 1. As miners complete at least 1
Note that if Δ > 𝑚/12, 12𝑒Δ
transaction, the lemma is trivially true.Now we consider the other
case and have the following.
Í
(𝑖)
Lemma 4. If 𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗 ≥ 1/2 holds for every transaction 𝑗, then

𝑖=1 𝑗 ∈𝑆

𝑚−

(1−𝜃 )𝑛
2
𝑚

(1−𝜃 )𝑛

) ≤ 𝑒− 2 ,
𝑚
where the first inequality follows by inequality of arithmetic and
geometric means, the second inequality follows by the fact that
Í𝑚 (𝑖)
𝑥
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗 ≥ 1/2, and the third inequality follows by (1 − 1/𝑥) ≤
≤

(

𝑒 −1 for 𝑥 ≥ 1. Taking the summation over all possible 𝑆 ∈ A, the
probability that at most 𝜃𝑛 transactions are selected is at most
 
𝑚
Õ
ÕÖ
𝑛 − (1−𝜃 )𝑛
(𝑖)
2
(1 −
𝑝𝑗 ) ≤
𝑒
𝜃𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑆 ∈A

𝑗 ∈𝑆

(1−𝜃 )𝑛
𝑛𝜃𝑛
· 𝑒− 2
(𝜃𝑛)!
(1−𝜃 )𝑛
𝑒
≤ ( )𝜃𝑛 · 𝑒 − 2 .
𝜃
Taking 𝜃 = 𝑒 −2 , simple calculation shows that the right side of the
inequality above is 𝑒 𝑐𝑛 for 𝑐 ≤ −0.02, and the lemma is proved. □

≤

Î Í
(𝑖)
The last equality follows as when we expand 𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑗 ∈𝑆 𝜋 𝑗 , any
Î
(𝑖)
summand corresponds to 𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜋𝜎 (𝑖) for some mapping 𝜎. Using
the the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, we have
Given Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, Theorem 2 follows directly.
Í𝑚 Í
Í𝑚 (𝑖)
(𝑖)
𝑚
Õ
ÖÕ
Õ 𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗
5.2.2 Finality-duration. For ease of presentation, we let 𝑠 = min{𝑐 1𝑚/Δ, 𝑐 2𝑛}
𝑖=1 𝑗 ∈𝑆 𝜋 𝑗
(𝑖)
Pr(𝜎𝑆 ) =
𝜋𝑗 ≤ (
)𝑚 = (
)𝑚 . (recall Theorem 2). We will characterize finality-duration in terms
𝑚
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑗 ∈𝑆
𝜎𝑆 ∈Ω𝑆
𝑗 ∈𝑆
of 𝑠. Recall that a miner needs to make two decisions: (i) which
transaction to include in the new block, and (ii) which two previTaking summation over all possible 𝑆 ∈ A, the event that at most
ous blocks to refer to. The two decisions are independent. In the
𝑘 transactions are selected is at most
previous subsection we have discussed (i), and in this subsection
Í𝑚 (𝑖)
Õ Õ
Õ Õ 𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗
we focus on (ii), as this affects how the DAG grows.
𝑚
Pr(𝜎𝑆 ) ≤
(
) .
𝑚
It should be clear that since the verification reward of a trans𝑆 ∈A 𝜎𝑆 ∈Ω𝑆
𝑆 ∈A 𝑗 ∈𝑆
action (block) is evenly distributed among miners who append a
Í𝑚 (𝑖 )
Í
block of the same distance to it, a miner always prefers a block with
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗
Now let 𝑎 𝑗 =
. It is easy to see that 𝑛𝑗=1 𝑎 𝑗 = 1. Fur𝑚
no descendants. At any particular time 𝑡, we call a block without
Í
(𝑖)
thermore, since 𝑚
descendants as a leaf at 𝑡, and denote by 𝐿𝑡 the set of leaves. We are
𝑖=1 𝜋 𝑗 < 12Δ, we have 𝑎 𝑗 ≤ 12Δ/𝑚. We apply
1
−1 ,
interested in the size of 𝐿𝑡 . Notice that in the classical blockchain
Lemma 3 by taking 𝛿 = ⌈𝑚/(12Δ)
≤
12Δ/(𝑚
+
12Δ),
𝜁
=
𝑘𝛿
≤
𝑒
⌉
system, |𝐿𝑡 | is 1 since it is a chain. However, in a non-linear model,
we know that
Õ Õ
|𝐿𝑡 | is not necessarily 1. Principally, |𝐿𝑡 | could grow arbitrarily
Pr(𝜎𝑆 ) ≤ 𝑒 𝑘 𝜁 𝑚−𝑘 ≤ 𝑒 −𝑚/2 .
large, but what we will show in this section is that, |𝐿𝑡 | is always
𝑆 ∈A 𝜎𝑆 ∈Ω𝑆
bounded when miners are using their equilibrium strategies. In this
Hence, the lemma is proved.
□
case, although we are considering a non-linear model, it is “almost

linear", as implied by Theorem 3. Based on this result, we further
leverage the techniques from random walk to prove that, for every
block, after a delay of 𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠) units of time, all blocks will be its
descendant (Theorem 4), consequently, if we set ℓ = Θ(𝑠 log 𝑠) in
our design, every block will be verified by all users, and security
follows.
As we mentioned before, each new block will refer to two leaves
in 𝐿𝑡 . As every block offers the same total amount of verification
reward, every leaf appears the same to the miners (unless they are
in conflict with previous blocks and then miners will be biased
based on the LWD rule). Therefore, a new block will randomly
select two leaves to refer to. Assuming leaves are not conflicting
with previous blocks, we show that |𝐿𝑡 | will be 𝑂 (𝑠) in the long
run with an extremely high probability. First, it is easy to see that
if |𝐿𝑡 | ≤ 𝑠, then 𝐿𝑡 +1 ≥ 𝑠 as the 𝑠 new blocks will be leaves at 𝑡 + 1.
The following lemma shows that if |𝐿𝑡 | is sufficiently large, then
with very high probability it will reduce to 𝑂 (𝑠) after enough time.
Lemma 5. Let 𝜖 be an arbitary small constant. If |𝐿𝑡 | ≥ 1/𝜖 3 and
|𝐿𝑡 | ≥ 4𝑠, then with sufficiently high probability (at least 1 − 𝑂 (𝜖)),
(1−3𝜖)𝑠
|𝐿𝑡 +1 | = |𝐿𝑡 | − 𝑋 + 𝑠 ≤ |𝐿𝑡 | −
, i.e., 𝐿𝑡 decreases by at least
2
Ω(𝑠).
See Chen et al. [6] for the full proof of Lemma 5.
The above lemma shows that if |𝐿𝑡 | is large, then with high
probability |𝐿𝑡 | shall decrease, however, what we are interested in
is the probability that |𝐿𝑡 | ≤ 𝑂 (𝑠) for all 𝑡 ≥ 0. Towards this, we
need to cast the problem as a random walk. Lemma 5 shows that
with the probability of (1 − 𝑂 (𝜖)) 3 = 1 − 𝑂 (𝜖), |𝐿𝑡 | can decrease
3(1−3𝜖)𝑠
by
≥ 𝑠, while with probability of at most 𝑂 (𝜖), |𝐿𝑡 | can
2
increase by at most 𝑠. This can be interpreted as a random walk
which walks right (increase) by 𝑠 steps with the probability of
1 − 𝑂 (𝜖), and walks left (decrease) by 𝑠 steps with the probability
of 𝑂 (𝜖). The following lemma is proved for a general random walk.
Lemma 6 ([8], pp.272). Consider a random walk starting at 𝑅𝑊0 =
0, Pr(𝑅𝑊𝑖+1 − 𝑅𝑊𝑖 = 𝑠) = 𝑝, Pr(𝑅𝑊𝑖+1 − 𝑅𝑊𝑖 = −𝑠) = 𝑞 where
𝑝 + 𝑞 = 1 and 𝑠 ∈ Z>0 . If 𝑝 > 𝑞, then
𝑝 −𝑞
lim Pr(𝑅𝑊𝑖 ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) =
.
𝑛→∞
𝑝
If 𝑝 < 𝑞, the above limit is 0.
Now we are ready to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let 𝜖 be a small constant such that 𝑠 > 1/𝜖 3 . With
very high probability (at least 1 − 𝑂 (𝜖)), |𝐿𝑡 | ≤ 5𝑠 for all 𝑡 ≥ 0.
Proof. Recall that |𝐿0 | = 0. Let 𝑡 ∗ be the smallest time where
|𝐿𝑡 ∗ | ≥ 4𝑠, then |𝐿𝑡 ∗ | ≤ 5𝑠. Now we take 𝑡 ∗ as a starting time, |𝐿𝑡 ∗ |
as a starting point and take the random walk interpretation. Using
Lemma 6, we have that
1 − 𝑂 (𝜖) − 𝑂 (𝜖)
lim Pr(|𝐿𝑡 | ≤ |𝐿𝑡 ∗ |, ∀1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛) ≤
𝑛→∞
1 − 𝑂 (𝜖)
= 1 − 𝑂 (𝜖).
Therefore, the probability that |𝐿𝑡 | is bounded by 5𝑠 for all 𝑡 ≥ 0 is
at least 1 − 𝑂 (𝜖).
□
Lemma 7. Let 𝜖 be a small constant such that 𝑠 > 1/𝜖 3 . For any
transaction at 𝑡 that is not in conflict with prior transactions, with

sufficiently high probability (at least 1 − 𝑂 (𝜖)) every block appended
at or after 𝑡 + 𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠) will be its descendant.
Proof. According to Theorem 3, we focus on the event that
|𝐿𝑡 | ≤ 5𝑠 for all 𝑡 ≥ 0, which happens with 1 − 𝑂 (𝜖) probability.
For ℎ ≥ 𝑡, let Ψℎ be the subset of blocks in 𝐿ℎ which has a
directed path from some fixed block 𝜏0 ∈ 𝐿𝑡 , which is a random
subset. Let 𝜓ℎ = E(|Ψℎ |). Consider 𝐿ℎ+1 . For any block 𝜏𝑖 ∈ 𝐿ℎ+1 ,
let 𝑋𝑖 be a binary random variable indicating whether 𝜏𝑖 refers to
some block in Ψℎ , and hence admits a directed path from 𝜏0 . Then
we know
|Ψℎ | 
2 + |Ψℎ |(|𝐿ℎ | − |Ψℎ |)
Pr(𝑋𝑖 = 1) =
|𝐿ℎ | 
2

|Ψℎ |(2|𝐿ℎ | − |Ψℎ | − 1)
=
.
|𝐿ℎ |(|𝐿ℎ | − 1)
We consider |Ψℎ+1 |. It is obvious that if |Ψℎ | = |𝐿ℎ |, then every
block in 𝐿ℎ+1 refers to some block in Ψℎ and thus admits a directed
path from 𝜏0 , hence, |𝐿ℎ+1 | = |Ψℎ+1 |, and similarly we have |𝐿ℎ+𝑗 | =
|Ψℎ+𝑗 | for all 𝑗 ≥ 1. Otherwise, we assume 1 ≤ |Ψℎ | ≤ |𝐿ℎ | − 1.
Then 2|𝐿ℎ | − |Ψℎ | − 1 ≥ |𝐿ℎ |, and we have


𝜓ℎ
|Ψℎ |(2|𝐿ℎ | − |Ψℎ | − 1)
≥
.
E(𝑋𝑖 ) = E
|𝐿ℎ |(|𝐿ℎ | − 1)
|𝐿ℎ | − 1
Í
Note that |Ψℎ+1 | = 𝑖 𝑋𝑖 . It is easy to calculate that


1
𝜓ℎ+1 = E(|Ψℎ+1 |) ≥ 𝜓ℎ 1 +
.
|𝐿ℎ | − 1
This means, starting from 𝜓𝑡 = 1, for each 𝜓ℎ where ℎ ≥ 𝑡,
either
𝜓ℎ = |𝐿ℎ | and thus 𝜓ℎ′ = |𝐿ℎ′ | for all ℎ ′ ≥ ℎ, or 𝜓ℎ+1 ≥

1 + |𝐿 1|−1 𝜓ℎ . Since |𝐿ℎ | ≤ 5𝑠, 𝜓ℎ increases sufficiently close to
ℎ
|𝐿ℎ | ≤ 5𝑠 when ℎ ≥ 𝑡 + 𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠), and the theorem is proved. □
Given the above lemma, if we set ℓ, the verification depth to
be ℓ ≥ 𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠), then any transaction at 𝑡 will be verified by all
the users after 𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠) units of time with high probability. The
following theorem is thus true.
Theorem 4. If 𝑠 > 1/𝜖 3 and ℓ ≥ 𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠), then with probability
of at least 1 − 𝑂 (𝜖), any transaction at 𝑡 will be verified by all the
users after 𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠) units of time.
Remark. Recall that the scalability of the system increases as Δ increases, while 𝑠 = min{𝑐 1𝑚/Δ, 𝑐 2𝑛}, and hence the finality-duration
𝑂 (𝑠 log 𝑠) decreases as Δ increases. Theorem 4 shows trade-off between the scalability and finality-duration.
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CONCLUSION

We provide the first systematic analysis on blockchain systems
with respect to three major parameters, verification, scalability, and
finality-duration. We establish an impossibility result showing no
blockchain system can simultaneously achieve the three properties.
We complement the existing blockchain systems by establishing
the first NLB that achieves both full verification and scalability. We
also reveal, for the first time, the trade-off between scalability and
finality-duration in NLB. It is not clear whether a better trade-off
exists or not.
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